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[L. A. No. 23536. In Bank. May 10, 1955.] 
I.E.S. CORPORATION (a Corporation) et a!., Petitioners, 
v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
et a!., Respondents; MAX GOLD et al., Real Partif-' in 
Interest. 
[1] Depositions-Examination-Scope of Inquiry.-In interest of 
full disclosure, witness in deposition taken pursuant to Code 
Civ. Proc., § 2021, subd. I, must answer all questions seeking 
nonpriviIeged information that is: material to subject matter 
of pending action, and he cannot block interrogation by con-
tending that it is "fishing expedition" or by urging secrecy of 
his methods of doing business. 
[2] Id.-Examination.-Taking of deposition must not be abused, 
and witness need not answer questions that serve no proper 
purpose or are irrelevant. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2065, 2066.) 
[3] Id. - Examination - Scope of Inquiry. - With reference to 
issues raised in pending action involving contracts for pur-
chase of war surplus engines and equipment from defendant, 
questions asked defendant in pretrial deposition as to his 
knowledge of engines and their market values and as to identity 
of persons who sold goods to defendant or from whom he in· 
tended to buy are material and must be answered, where dE'-
fendant's knowledge is relevant to question whether his repre-
sentations were made without belief or in absence of reasonable 
grounds for belief in their truth (eiv. Code, § 1710, subds. I, 
2), where plaintiff is entitled to learn sources of goods to de-
termine whether they were sold to defendant in condition and 
at prices represented and whether sellers had conspired with 
defendant to defraud plaintiff, and where identity of persons 
from whom defendant intended to buy is relevant in that, if 
his answers indicated that he had no anticipated source of 
supply, such fact would tend to prove that he made promises 
to plaintiff without intention to perform them. (Civ. Code, 
§ 1710, subd. 4.) 
[4] Witnesses-Privileged Oommunication-Attorney and Olient.-
Attorney-elient privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 2) 
cannot be defeated by attempting to elicit privileged com-
munications from client instead of attorney. 
[5] Depositions-Examination-Scope of Inquiry.-With refer-
ence to issues raised in pending action involving contracts 
• 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Depositions, § 50; Am.Jm., Depositions, 
152 et seq. 
MeR. Dig. References: [1-3,5] Depositions, § 19; [4] Witnessea, 
174; [6] Mandamus, § 15(6). 
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for purchase of war surplus engines from defendant, questions 
asked defendant in pretrial deposition as to whether or not 
he had conversation about buying stock in plaintiff company 
had no bearing on invalidity of contracts, breaches of COD-
tracts, misrepresentations or conspiracies alleged in complaint, 
• and questions seeking identities of everyone defendant knew 
in surplus business and everyone he interviewed in Chicago 
were too broad, and defendant properly refused to answer such 
questions. 
[6] Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.-'Where appeal from 
final judgment would not afford adequate remedy for correct-
ing order of court sustaining defendant's refusal to answer 
questions on depositioD, mandamus is proper remedy. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel Superior Court ot 
Los Angeles County and Arnold Praeger, Judge thereof, to 
set aside order sustaining refusal by defendant, in pending 
action, to answer certain questions in pretrial deposition and 
to enter an order compelling defendant to answer such ques-
tions. Writ granted. 
Combs & Hoose, Lee Combs and Harned Pettus Hoose tor 
Petitioners. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Wm. E. 
Lameroux, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents. 
Leo K. Gold for Real Parties in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Petitioners, plaintiffs in an action pending 
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seek a writ of 
mandate directing respondent court to set aside an order 
sustaining defendant's refusal to answer certain questions in 
a pretrial deposition and to enter an order compelling de-
fendant to answer these questions and any other similar 
questions that may be asked. 
The complaint in the pending action alleges that plaintiff· 
entered into a series of contracts and options for the purchase 
of war surplus engines, machmery, and equipment from 
defendant in reliance on defendant's representations that he 
possessed suffici~t funds and organizational capacity to per-
form, that the engines were new and serviceable, and that he 
would obtain them for plaintiff at below market rates. It 
·PlaintiJl's are two closely related corporations bearing the same name. 
III both the 'pleadings and the briefs they are frequentl¥ refiued to .. 
.. eorporatioD aDd wiD be 10 referred to hereiD. 
) 
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is charged that these representations were fraudulent, that 
plaintiff's former president exceeded his authority in nego-
tiating and signing the contpacts on plaintiff's behalf, and 
that defendant breached the contract by failing to deliver 750 
engines. It is also alleged that plaintiff and defendant re-
d"aced the contracts and options to a single integrated option, 
but when plaintiff attempted to acquire certain machinery by 
exercising a separate and divisible part of the option, defend-
ant refused to perform; that plaintiff issued a notice of 
rescission as to all contracts and options except those per-
taining to certain items of machinery that already had been 
delivered and accepted; and that although defendant con-. 
tinues to demand payments, plaintiff owes nothing to defend-
ant but is itself entitled to damages because the accepted goods 
were inferior in quality and higher in price than represented. 
The complaint also contains extensive alJegations concern-
ing a conspiracy by defendant, various sellers of war surplus 
engines, and plaintiff's former president. It is alleged that 
"the defendants and each and every one of them did conspire 
and agree that they would purchase and give option for and 
purport to sell to the plaintiff certain war surplus and other 
machinery and equipment at extremely high and unfair prices; 
that defendants and each of them did further conspire to de-
fraud the plantiffs by misrepresenting to the plaintiffs the 
true condition of said machinery and equipment, by obtaining 
secret rebates and secret profits by reason of the plaintiffs' 
purchase of said machinery and equipment, by the delivery 
to the plaintiffs by the defendants and each of them of ma-
chinery and equipment of an inferior type which was repre-
sented to the plaintiffs as unused machinery or machinery 
and in good condition (sic), and by doing and conspiring 
to do each and every one of said acts." The complaint 
charges that pursuant'to the conspiracy, defendant and plain-
tiff's former president made an extensive buying trip together 
during which they got in touch with sellers of war surplus 
machinery and conspired with them to "lure the plaintiffs 
into numerous purchases of non-existent machinery, inferior 
machinery, highly overpriced machinery, machinery as to 
which the defendants and each of them had no right to grant 
options or to sell, . . . and to extract huge secret profits and 
rebates from plaintiffs and to sell to plaintiffs inferidr and 
unmerchandiseable machinery at a vast profit." Numerous 
llctitious persons are joined as defendants, and it is alleged 
that they are the unknown conspirators who will be served 
) 
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with summons as soon as their identities are divulged. The 
complaint requests declaratory relief as to the contracts and 
options between plaintiff and defendant, restitution of de-
posits paid to defendant, recovery of damages caused by 
defendant'8 misrepresentations, and the recovery of secret 
profits and rebates from defendant and his coconspirators. 
In giving his deposition, defendant answered questions 
concerning his negotiations with plaintiff's former president, 
the execution of the integrated option, his delivery of goods 
to plaintiff and plaintiff's subsequent refusal to pay him or 
to accept further deliveries. He admitted making the buying 
trip with plaintiff's former president and said that he had 
offered to sell him engines that they had inspected together. 
He refused, however, to reveal from whom, in what manner, 
and at what prices he had acquired his engines. He was 
asked about the nature of his business with Green Bros. Truck-
ing Sales Company of Chicago, Illinois, whether he had pur-
chased 650 to 750 engines from them, and whether he had 
resold these engines to plaintiff, but he refused to answer. 
Nor would he reveal the identities of any sellers of war 
surplus machinery with whom he dealt during the buying 
trip or the nature of his transactions with them, or answer 
the questions: "Who in it [the surplus business] do you 
know?" "What other companies besides GrE!'en Brothers did 
you interview in Chicago 1" "Prior to this information that 
someone else had bought stock in the I.E.S., you had a con-
versation with Tom Benevides about buying into the company 
yourself, didn't you 1" "By the way, did your lawyer tell 
you before this hearing, or prior to today, not to name the 
yards or the people on your trip 7" He also refused to 
answer questions concerning his knowledge of engines and 
their prices. Asserting that the questions were irrelevant and 
immaterial, that no foundation for them had been laid, that 
communications by his counsel were privileged, and that he 
was not required to reveal the sources of the goods that he 
sold, defendant refused to answer fifty-five questions. Of 
these, the superior court ordered him to answer only three. 
[1] In the interest of full disclosure, the witness in a 
deposition ~ken pursuant to section 2021, subdivision 1, of 
the Code of Civil Procedure must answer all questions seek-
ing nonprivileged information that is material to the subject 
matter of the pending action (McOlatchy Newspapers v. 
Superior Oourt, 26 Ca1.2d 386, 395 [159 P.2d 944]; San 
Francisco Gas &- Eke. 00. v. Superior Oo-u.rt, 155 Cal. 30, 34 
) 
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[99 P. 359, 17 Ann.Cas. 933] ; Verdier v. Superior Court, 88 
Cal.App.2d 527, 531 [199 P.~d 325] ; Rossbach v. Superior 
Court, 43 Cal.App. 729, 731 [185 P. 879] ; see Holm v. Supe-
rior Court, 42 Cal.2d 500, 505 [267 P.2d 1025, 268 P.2d 722] ; 
Ahern v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.2d 27, 31 [245 P.2d 
568] ; Carnation Co. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 138, 
140 [214 P.2d 552]), and he cannot block the interrogation 
by contending that it is a "fishing expedition" or by urging 
the secrecy of his methods of doing business.· [2] At the 
same time, the taking of a deposition must not be abused 
(Crocker v. Conrey, 140 Cal. 213, 217 [73 P. 1006», and the 
witness need not answer questions that serve no proper pur-
pose or are irrelevant. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2065. 2066; 
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Ca1.2d 
386, 395; see Dastagir v. Dastagir, 109 Cal.App.2d 809, 816-
820 [241 P.2d 656], and cases and authorities there cited.) 
[3] In the present case, most of the unanswered questions 
seek to determine the identities of persons who sold goods 
to defendant or from whom he intended to buy and defend-
ant's knowledge of engines and their market values. Defend-
ant's knowledge is relevant to the question whether his 
repre~entations were made without belief, or in the absence 
of reasonable grounds for belief, in their truth. (Civ. Code 
§ 1710, subds. 1. 2.) Similarly, plaintiff was entitled to 
learn the sources of the goods to determine whether they 
were sold to defendant in the condition and at the prices 
represented and whether the sellers had conspired with de-
fendant to defraud plaintiff. Moreover, the identity of 
persons from whom defendant intended to buy is relevant, 
for if defendant's answers indicated that he had no antici-
pated source of supply, that fact would tend to prove that 
he made promises to plaintiff without the intention of per-
forming them. (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 4.) Forty-eight 
of the questions involved seek information of the foregoing 
kind and therefore must be answered. t 
Four questions, however, are not within the seope of proper 
interrogation. [4] On the ground that it was a privileged 
*Methods of doing business, other than secret processes, developments, 
or research, have not been protected from inquiry in deposition proceed-
ings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Mos8 V. Aetna Stand· 
ard Engineeri.ng Co., 11 Fed. Rules Serve 594; see 59 Yale L.J. 117, 42 
Cal.L.Rev. 829.) 
tAs numbered in Exhibit B of plaintiff's petition, the qlleationa that 
aut be anawered a.re 1"" 7-10, 12-19, 21-48, and SO-s:i.. 
564 ':.E.S. CORPORATION V. SUPERIOR COURT [44 C.2d 
communication, defendant refused to answer the question, 
"By the way, did your lawyer tell you before this hearing, 
or prior to today, not to name the yards or the people on 
your trip?" Code of Civil Procedure, section 1881, subdivi-
sion 2, provides that "An attorney can not, without the 
conSent of his client, be examined as to any communication 
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the 
course of professional employment." and it is settled that 
the privilege cannot be defeated by attempting to elicit the 
privileged communications from the client instead of the attor-
ney. (City &7 County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 
37 Ca1.2d 227, 236 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418], and 
cases cited.) 
On the grounds that they were irrelevant and immaterial, 
defendant refused to answer the following questions: "Prior 
to this information that someone else had bought stock in 
the I.E.S., you had a conversation with Tom Benavides about 
buying into the company yourself, didn't you f" "What 
other companies besides Green Brothers did you interview 
in Chicago?" "Who in it [the surplus business] do you 
know Y" [5] Whether or not defendant had a conversation 
about buying stock in plaintiff has no bearing on the in-
validity of the contracts, breaches of contract, misrepresenta-
tions, or conspiracies alleged in the complaint. The ques-
tions seeking the identities of everyone defendant knew 
in the surplus business and everyone he interviewed in Chi-
cago were too broad. It is not improbable that defendant 
knew and interviewed people who had no connection with 
his transactions with plaintiff, and the identity of such per-
sons would be irrelevant. In this respect plaintiff may secure 
all the information to which it is entitled by limiting its 
inquiry to the identity of persons who were connected with 
the transactions that are the subject matter of the action. 
[6] Since an appeal from the final judgment would not 
afford an adequate remedy for correcting the order of re-
spondent court sustaining defendant's refusal to answer, 
mandamus is the proper remedy. (McClatchy Newspapers v. 
Superior Court, supra, 26 Ca1.2d 386, 392.) Let a writ of 
mandate issue directing respondent to set aside its order 
and to make the necessary orders to enable completion o.f 
the deposition in accord with the views expressed herein. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., 8lld Spence, J., concurred. 
